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TWO NOTES ON THE VERBINES.
Cic. Div. in Caec. § 25.
Huic ego homini iam ante denwntio, si a
me causam hanc vos agi volueritis, rationem
illi defendendi lotam esse mutandam, et ita
mutandam ut meliore et honestiore condicione
quam qua ipse vult imitetur homines eos,
quos ipse vidit amplissimos, L. Crassurn et
M. Antonium, qui nihil se arbitrabantur ad
indicia causasque amicorum praeter fidem et
ingenivm adferre oportere.
With part of the above (the doubtful
clause et ita mutandam) I have dealt in a
previous note, G.R. vol. xviii. p. 208. That
something was felt to be wrong with what
follows may be inferred from the variants
reported, e.g. condicione sit Pseud. Asc. and
Lg. 45, esse vult Par. 7776 (p), G1, Par.
7822, and the dett. A better line of emenda-
tion is suggested by the fact that in the
three leading members of what I propose to
call the Y family of MSS., viz. Par. 7776 (p—
11th cent.), Lg. 29, and Harl. 2687 (which
I cite together as pqr), before imitetur we
have ut. If to this ut, we add the letter i,
on the supposition that it may have fallen
out in front of imitetur, and so read uti,
construction and meaning alike become quite
clear : rationem . . . mutandam . . . ut meliore
et honestiore condicione quam qua ipse vult
uti imitetur etc. Hortensius, if left to him-
self, would be at his old tricks ; but he is
hereby warned that he will have to rely in
this trial, as Crassus and Antonius always
did, on his own fides and ingenium..
In Verr. ii, 1 § 149 (Muell. p. 194, 36).
Iste quid ageret nesciebat; si in acceptum
non rettulisset, putabat se aliquid defensionis
habiturum : Habonium porro inteUegebat rem
totam esse patefacturum. Tametsi quid
poterat esse apertius quam nunc est ? Ut uno
minus teste haberet, Habonio opus in accep-
tum rettulit quadriennio post quam diem operi
dixerat.
The above is given as in Mueller's text,—
eliminating, however, the ridiculous German
commas (e.g. between post and quam) which
have so long vexed our classical texts. But
Madvig, in his Epistola Critica ad Orellium
(pp. 89-90), had already shown a better
way of punctuation, which is followed in the
main by Jordan in the Zurich edition.
What Madvig failed to see is that, on any
explanation, haberet is an impossible reading.
In place of haberet, it is natural to sug-
gest ageret, such interchanges being of not
infrequent occurrence. For example, in his
Actio Prima (Mueller, p. 133, 36) all the
MSS. give secum habere for secum agere. For
the construction, compare § 117 uno signo
ut sit minus,—though the ut there is not a
final ut, as here.
We ought to return, therefore, to the
punctuation suggested by Madvig, and read
Iste . . . esse patefacturum—tametsi quid . . .
quam nunc est ?—ut uno minus teste ageret,
Habonius . . . dixerat. Habonius was the
fraudulent guardian, who wanted a quittance
for his contract. Verres saw that if he
declined to give such a quittance, he might
be able to enter some defence of the charge
now brought against him: on the other hand
(porro) he saw that such a refusal on his part
would lead Habonius to make a clean breast
of the whole business (just as though anything
were needed to complete the exposure !) and
so, in order that he might shut his partner's
mouth (ut uno minus teste ageret), he gave
him the quittance asked for four years after






GAYE ON PLATO'S CONCEPTION OF IMMORTALITY.
The Platonic Conception of Immortality and
its Connexion with the Theory of Ideas.
By R. K. GATE. Pp. x + 259. London :
C. J. Clay and Sons. 5s. net.
MR. GATE'S Essay, which obtained the Hare
Prize in 1904, deals with an interesting and
important aspect of Platonic speculation.
For the questions raised in it concern not
merely immortality and the Ideas, but also
the Platonic doctrine of the soul in general
and its relation to body. Beginning with
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a brief, but sufficient, sketch of pre-Platonic
views of immortality, Mr. Gaye proceeds to
discuss the views of Plato as developed
successively in the Symposium, Phaedrus,
Republic, and Phaedo. Then follow two
chapters in which the results of this dis-
cussion of these ' earlier' views are summed
up, and the changes which mark the later
Platonic doctrines are indicated. Next, we
have an examination of the teaching as to
the soul and its immortality in the Timaeus
and the Laws; and the book concludes with
three chapters on ' Immortality and the
later Platonism,' ' the Degeneration of
Souls,' and ' the Place of Immortality in
Plato's Philosophy.' I t will be seen from
this table of contents that the ground is
well covered; and it may be gathered also
that Mr. Gaye is an adherent of that theory
of Platonic development of which Dr. Henry
Jackson has been for years past so able an
exponent. Indeed, as is stated in the
preface (p. vii), this Essay is ' based through-
out on the assumption that there was some
such modification of Plato's philosophical
doctrines as they [i.e. Dr. Jackson and
Mr. Archer-Hind] hold to have taken place.'
Accordingly our estimate of the value of
this Essay as a contribution to the study of
Platonism, must depend largely upon our
attitude towards this fundamental assump-
tion of an ' earlier' and ' later' theory of
Ideas. Personally, I am inclined to believe
that the Ideas remained Ideas, naked and
unashamed, to the end of the chapter, and
to disbelieve that the ' Parmenides ' hints at
reformatory fig-leaves. But it would be
irrelevant here to argue the point the
Essayist assumes. There is, however,
another side to this dependence upon the
conclusions of the scholars named, and that
is the almost complete omission of any refer-
ence to the work of Platonic scholars out-
side Cambridge. A continental reader could
not fail, I imagine, to be surprised at what
he would regard as a characteristic display
of insularity. For example, Mr. Gaye
discusses at some length the order and dates
of composition of the Symposium, Meno,
Phaedrus, Phaedo, and Republic. These
matters have been discussed already sescen-
tiens; there is a large literature dealing
with them. Yet, strangely enough, Mr.
Gaye takes no account of any theories other
than those of Dr. Jackson, Dr. "W. H.
Thompson, and Mr. E. S. Thompson. His
remarks are chiefly directed against the
view of the last named scholar that the
Symposium is to be classed with the Phaedo
and dated after the Meno and Republic; and
he has little difficulty in showing that the
arguments by which this view is supported
are ' flimsy' in the extreme. It is much
more natural, as Mr. Gaye maintains, to
class the Symposium with the Phaedrus ; and
Mr. Gaye may also be correct in his view
that the Phaedrus is later than the Sym-
posium, as to which opinions seem to be
about equally divided. Rather more impor-
tant is the question as to the order of the
dialogues Phaedrus, Republic, Phaedo. M.
Lutoslawski, in his ' Plato's Logic,' has
•collected a good many arguments and
opinions in favour of the view that the
Phaedrus is later than the Republic, and the
Republic later than the Phaedo. If Mr.
Gaye believes it possible to arrive at a fixed
order for these dialogues, it would have
been well if he had taken account of M.
Lutoslawski's statements, especially such a
statement as that ' the proofs of the soul's
immortality in the Republic and the
Phaedrus are posterior to the Phaedo. They
show a greater certainty, an advance in the
form of expression, carried further in the
Phaedrus than in the Republic '; and again,
' Plato laid great stress on the immortality
of the soul in the Laws, and out of all his
arguments in favour of this doctrine he
selected the proof given in the Phaedrus
as adequate (Jxavdv)' (p. 335). In view of
these statements, and the literary references
by which they are supported, it is difficult
to understand how Mr. Gaye can write
(p. 73) : ' No one, so far as I am aware, has
attempted to ascertain the relation in which
the Phaedo stands to the Republic by exa-
mining and comparing the respective proofs
of immortality contained in the two dia-
logues, and the general attitude towards the
question which Plato adopts in each of
them.' Possibly no one has yet succeeded
in ascertaining the truth as to these
matters; but that is another thing. And
I venture to doubt whether Mr. Gaye him-
self will produce conviction in the minds of
those not already convinced. In fact, one
may ask whether Plato intended any of his
proofs to carry logical demonstration, or to
serve as more than provisional supports for
what was his personal belief; and one may
reasonably suppose, as Prof. Shorey has put
it, tha t ' the logical obstacles to a positive
demonstration of personal immortality were
as obvious to him as they are to his critics.'
Mr. Gaye evidently thinks that the final
argument in the Phaedo, and it alone, was
entirely satisfactory to Plato's own mind ;
but this implies that Plato was the victim
of a fallacy, and it leaves unexplained the
M 2
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fact that in the Laws he chooses another
proof rather than t^ his one.
In connexion with the doctrine of immor-
tality in the Phaedo, Mr. Gaye has an
interesting, and I think novel, discussion
of the reasons which may have led Plato at
this date to attach so much importance to
immortality. He supposes that while in
the Republic Plato still hopes for direct
cognition of the Ideas, in the Phaedohe has
given up this hope and resorts to the doctrine
of immortality as affording to the philo-
sopher ' his only ground for hoping that he
will sooner or later attain direct cognition
of the ideas.' That Plato was for so long
deceived as to the possibility of obtaining
' absolute knowledge' in this life it is not
easy to believe; nor does it follow that
because he attached importance to immor-
tality we must find a reason for it in his
despair.
Another problem of interest, upon which
Mr. Gaye joins issue with Mr. Archer-Hind,
is this: ' Does Plato in the Phaedo admit
the possibility that souls exist in a state of
complete separation from body?' Mr.
Archer-Hind had answered this question in
the negative, partly on the strength of
Phaedr. 246 c, but Mr. Gaye sets aside that
passage as a piece of ' conscious allegorizing'
and insists on pressing the sense of such
phrases as x«Y»s o-wjuai-wv (Pkaed. 76 c, 114 c)
to the utmost. However, it still remains
to be proved that Plato purposed any definite
answer to the question, or meant o-ayta to be
construed in its widest sense. I t would
seem that he is mainly concerned to assume
a condition of soul where its energizing is
pure from all bodily iraOrj, whether or not we
ascribe to such a condition entire imma-
teriality. The object of Mr. Gaye's polemic
is, however, not to destroy but to fulfil Mr.
Archer-Hind's account of the ' earlier'
theory, by showing that in it if/vya-i corre-
spond in all respects to elSr], as equally
X<apuTTo. He displays the zeal of the son of
Zadok, who, by the way of the plain,
' overran Cushi,' but the tidings he brings
from the battle are, after all, much the
same.
We find the same zeal in overrunning the
conclusions of the first exponents of the
' later theory' in Mr. Gaye's exposition of
the Timaeus. He criticizes Mr. Archer-
Hind's interpretation of c. xiv from the
stand-point that here he 'has not carried
far enough the principle of interpretation
which has guided him in his treatment of
the Dialogue as a whole'; which means
that he has confused allegory with history,
symbol with fact, logical with chronological
sequence in his comments on the irp<im/ and
Sevripa yevecris. And I think Mr. Archer-
Hind could hardly deny that Mr. Gaye's
suggestions admirably serve to complete the
consistency of his account of the philosophy
of the Timaeus : VIKO. 8' 6 7rpa>Tos KOU TCXEU-
TCUOS SpafuLv!
In another point also Mr. Gaye diverges
from Mr. Archer-Hind. He believes that
the ' later theory ' allowed ideas of the four
elements, as well as of ' natural kinds,'
although ' Mr. Archer-Hind seems loth to
admit that this is so.' And he is dissatis-
fied also with a phrase of Dr. Jackson's
which speaks of the ' later ' ideas as ' only
hypothetically existent.' Against this Mr.
Gaye argues that ' the idea must always be
existent because it is an external mode of
absolute thought.' Here, too, I think con-
sistency is on the side of Mr. Gaye, who
certainly, throughout this Essay, shows
much ability and perspicacity in applying
his formulae. For the ' later' Platonism
these formulae seem to resolve themselves
into these two : ' The ideas are thoughts of
God: that is to say, they are permanent
modes of the operation of supreme vows.
Individual souls are the creatures of God :
that is to say, they are permanent deter-
minations of supreme vovs.' And thus, in
short, Plato explained the world as the self-
evolution of absolute thought. It is true
that this seems a nicely-rounded system of
idealism; but, had it not been for Hegel
and his kind, who would have thought of
imputing it to Plato 1 Can it be said that
this super-Berkeleian idealism is not im-
ported into the language of the Timaeus,
rather than legitimately extracted from it ?
Or can it be denied that the exponents of
this later Platonism are gifted with a philo-
sophico-historical imagination which leads
them, in their desire for TO IKWOV KOU rekeov,
to be wise above what is written 1
But whatever prejudices we may enter-
tain against the view of Plato's thought
and its development which Mr. Gaye adopts,
we cordially congratulate him on the
scholarly, lucid, and interesting manner in
which he has expounded his theme. A dis-
sertation of this quality on such a subject
is, in this country, a rare achievement. And
one cannot but observe that in the attrac-
tive format of the book we have a <rai//,a
appropriate to its tyvxq '• for in the book-
world a ij/vxr) avrr) KaO' avr-qv is by no means
a desideratum.
R. G. BURY.
